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In the post-Soviet space, Georgia and Ukraine are broadly perceived as
exceptions to the growing authoritarianism in the region owing to the far-
reaching political changes triggered by the so-called Colour Revolutions a
decade ago. This article examines Russia’s reaction to political changes in
Georgia and Ukraine in light of the interplay between the democracy-
promotion policies implemented by the EU and US and domestic patterns of
democratization. We argue that despite the relatively weak impact of EU
and US policies vis-a`-vis domestic structures, Russia has responded harshly
to (what it perceives as) a Western expansionist agenda in pursuit of
reasserting its own hegemonic position in the post-Soviet space. However,
coercive pressure from Russia has also unintended, counterproductive
effects. We argue that the pressure has actually made Georgia and Ukraine
more determined to pursue their pro-Western orientation and has spawned
democratization, thereby supporting the objectives of the Western
democracy promoters.
Keywords: democracy promotion; European Union; Eastern Partnership;
United States; Georgia; Ukraine; Russia
Introduction
Ukraine and Georgia are two countries that illustrate the effects of Western democ-
racy promotion in the domestic contestation against a backdrop of a powerful illib-
eral actor. They shed a new light on the role of external actors in shaping political
developments in target countries. The inﬂuence of both democracy promoters and
illiberal regional powers (“democracy challengers”) is interwoven because their
respective actions interact with each other while contending with diverse and shift-
ing domestic contexts. Our article examines the effects of Russia’s counteracting
strategies on democratization processes in Georgia and Ukraine, in light of the
intricate set of relations between the democracy-promotion policies pursued by
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the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) and domestic receptivity to
external inﬂuences. Thereby, we focus on one of the key themes of this special
issue: how do the policies of non-democratic regional powers affect domestic out-
comes and democracy promotion efforts by the US and EU in target countries?
While the collapse of the Soviet Union initially raised hopes for a sustainable
democratic transition, political developments in the former Soviet Union since the
late 1990s have dealt a death knell to the transition paradigm.1 Even though pursu-
ing different reform paths, most post-Soviet countries have entered a political grey
zone between authoritarianism and democratization.2 They have been depicted as
“hybrid regimes” characterized by competitive authoritarianism, where “formal
democratic institutions are viewed as a means of obtaining and exercising political
authority”, yet “where incumbents violation of those rules means, that the regime
fails to meet conventional minimum standards for democracy”.3
Georgia and Ukraine are relative exceptions due to the far-reaching political
changes that started a decade ago as a result of the so-called Colour Revolutions
(the Rose Revolution in 2003 in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in 2004 in
Ukraine).4 The new elites came to power on the grounds of opposing authoritarian-
ism and embracing democracy. The 2003–2004 revolutions also illustrated the role
of external actors in domestic political changes: the public protests were supported
by Western foundations mostly funded by the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development (USAID) and the EU member states.5 The emergence of
elites seemingly pursuing democratization appeared to strengthen the role of exter-
nal democracy promoters there.
However, political changes also triggered adverse reactions from a powerful
external player – Russia. The backlash, which followed the Colour Revolutions,
occurred ﬁrst and foremost within Russia itself, with the imposition of controls
over non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the de facto exclusion of the oppo-
sition from political life, and the shift toward the “sovereign democracy” model,
indicating the fears of contagion.6 But, above all, the events in Ukraine and
Georgia were interpreted in Moscow in terms of geopolitical contestation with
the West. The Rose Revolution triggered Russian concern over a loss of inﬂuence
in the post-Soviet space, while the Orange Revolution exacerbated Moscow’s fury
at the perceived subversive role of “Western agents”. This fury then shaped
Russia’s perception of the Maidan protests of 2013–2014, which in contrast to
the earlier mass revolts, turned violent and which Russia blamed on the West.
Therefore, we argue that despite the primacy of domestic factors accounting
for democratization with EU and US democracy promotion playing a secondary
role, Russia primarily responds to (what it perceives as) a Western expansionist
agenda in the post-Soviet space. And it is actually Russia’s reaction, rather than
democracy promotion per se, that most strongly inﬂuences domestic develop-
ments in these countries. Paradoxically, it seems to have ushered political
changes (even if limited and/or unsustainable) toward democratization and
resulted in a concerted push away from Russia. At the same time, Russia’s reac-
tion has also stimulated the US and EU’s responses in support of the countries in
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question, thereby strengthening their engagement in promoting domestic change.
Our argument is that Russia’s coercive actions have diminished its own inﬂuence
in some post-Soviet states as a “democracy spoiler” and strengthened the role of
democracy promoters.
In the ﬁrst section, we provide an overview of EU and US democracy pro-
motion policies and their (limited) effects in Georgia and Ukraine. We then
proceed to scrutinize when and how Russia has responded to – what it perceived
as – EU and US interference in domestic affairs. Finally, we examine the para-
doxical outcomes of Russia’s countervailing actions and specify the conditions
under which they inﬂuence democratization processes in Georgia and Ukraine.
In the concluding section, we offer broader generalizations emerging from the
two case studies.
Democratization – an externally-driven or a home-made process?
EU and US policies in Ukraine and Georgia: whither democracy promotion?
While in recent years the EU and the US have converged in their democracy pro-
motion policies, the EU has been less inclined to make democracy promotion
central to its strategy. This is a consequence of the EU’s new emphasis on “good
governance”,7 especially since the launch of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in 2009.
The EU’s policy in Eastern neighbouring countries highlights a paradox in
terms of democracy promotion. Since 2011 the EU has become more vocal
about promoting “deep democracy”.8 Along with existing instruments such as
the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), it has intro-
duced new tools for this purpose (for example, the European Endowment for
Democracy). These complement the instruments created under the EaP’s multilat-
eral track in 2009 to support democracy, for example, the Civil Society Forum. Yet,
since its launch in 2004, democracy promotion has not been the primary objective
of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP);9 security and stability are. In par-
ticular, the EaP has prioritized regulatory convergence with a view toward improv-
ing good governance in the Eastern neighbourhood. Upon the EaP, the EU adopted
explicit conditionality based on benchmarks only with regard to speciﬁc sectors
viewed as priority areas prior to opening negotiations on Deep and Comprehensive
Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs), as well as negotiations related to visa liberalization.
Some argue that functional cooperation reﬂects a shift in the EU’s approach to
democracy promotion, complementing the traditional “linkage” and “leverage”
strategies.10 This is because EU sectoral policies include strongly codiﬁed demo-
cratic governance provisions.11 Thus, while the “democratic governance
approach”12 does not target core political institutions, it indirectly promotes
democracy through embedding democratic principles (transparency, accountabil-
ity, participation) in sectoral cooperation and thus diffuses them in partner
countries’ practices.
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Closer scrutiny of EU conditions under key sectoral policies reveals that the EU
has only occasionally fostered the “incorporation of democratic principles into
administrative rules and practices” at the sectoral level.13 Instead, the EU has
sought to export those norms guaranteeing the quality and safety of products to
be traded under DCFTAs as well as anti-monopoly regulation, intellectual property
rights, and so on. Likewise, under the visa liberalization process it has prioritized
security-related rules at the expenses of human rights-related provisions. Further-
more, when launching the EaP, the EU accepted the political status quo in the
partner countries (with the exception of Belarus) without making explicit political
changes a precondition for closer ties, despite concerns over, for example, Azerbai-
jan. Democracy promotion was thus decoupled from functional aspects of inte-
gration in the neighbourhood.14
In Georgia, the EU has been consistent in its approach in terms of democracy
promotion, as evidenced in the Country Strategy Paper. Despite signiﬁcant pro-
gress in democratization since the Rose Revolution, subsequent developments
highlighted its fragility. In the EU’s view, the domination of the executive
branch of power has prevented Georgian democracy from consolidating. There-
fore, the EU has included support for democratic development as a priority in its
assistance documents.15 It has mobilized a wide range of assistance mechanisms
to promote democracy in Georgia and combined different types of support, for
example, support for core political institutions (for example, the parliament)
under the Rapid Reaction Mechanism and Technical Assistance for the Common-
wealth of Independent States (TACIS), as well as support for grass-roots organiz-
ations under the EIDHR and the Non-State Actors Local Authorities Program.
At the same time, the EU has placed a greater emphasis on good governance
and institution-building under the EaP’s bilateral track. Starting in 2010, the
Association Agreement together with a DCFTA emerged as an overarching priority
in Georgia-EU relations.16 While the Association Agreement includes references
to democracy and values,17 during the negotiations, the overarching focus has
been on legal approximation with trade-related acquis.
In Ukraine, continuity rather than change characterized the EU’s approach to
democracy promotion during 2005–2011, despite the persistent nature of the
many problems facing Ukraine. The lack of political will and capacity of the Ukrai-
nian authorities to initiate and sustain a comprehensive reform process meant that
the initial reform momentum developed in the wake of the Orange Revolution was
lost by 2009–2010. While articulating its assistance priorities under the EaP, the
EU did not acknowledge this deterioration sufﬁciently and only belatedly
reacted through democratic conditionality in 2011–2013.
In terms of assistance, a shift away from democracy promotion was evident.
The assistance agenda for 2011–2013 did not mention democracy as a key
reform priority and focussed on constitutional reform, the rule of law, combating
corruption, and improving the business and investment climate. Overall, there
was a shift toward good governance in more threat-oriented areas such as
justice, freedom and security, “integrated border management”, and disarmament.
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The EU’s assistance suffered from lax benchmarking and lacked explicit connec-
tion to democratic reforms. This indicated that Ukraine was perceived as a source
of threat and instability, accounting for the EU’s weakened role in democracy pro-
motion in Ukraine until 2012.
Nevertheless, the EU still conducted extensive democracy-related activities in
its bilateral assistance to both countries. The EU also outsourced democracy pro-
motion to other organizations such as the Council of Europe.18 Importantly, two
Council of Europe bodies – the Parliamentary Assembly and the Venice Commis-
sion, which provide monitoring, expertise, and advice to the government on elec-
tions, rule of law, and judiciary19 – act as prominent external “watchdogs”
premised on Ukraine’s and Georgia’s membership commitments. In Ukraine,
Europe has remained an important source of funding for civil society and the
media, a powerful role-model, and a reference point for the pro-democratic forces.
Regarding the US, democracy assistance programmes designed in the 1990s
had more modest goals than suspected by Russia (that is, regime change).20
When the Rose Revolution happened, USAID programmes concentrated on free
elections, functioning political institutions, and support to civil society.
However, in the years following the revolution, US assistance shifted toward sup-
porting the government and the new authorities’ priorities.21 This led to prioritizing
support for pro-government NGOs and to the termination of USAID’s biggest
media programme in 2005.22 Nevertheless, the current USAID strategy for
Georgia emphasizes democratic development by enhancing the government’s
accountability, as well as checks and balances.23 While promoting good govern-
ance, current USAID activities are more focussed on democracy than the EU,
with support for free and fair elections, independence of the media sector, and
the development of civil society.24
In the case of Ukraine, the US followed the pattern of the EU in terms of assum-
ing the commitment to democracy and the rule of law after the Orange Revolution.
So while in 2004–2005 US democracy assistance signiﬁcantly increased, since
2006 the amount of USAID democracy assistance has dropped signiﬁcantly.
Also, US support to non-state actors decreased by 70% between 2004 and 2007,
while assistance to the governmental sector increased.25 Thus in 2013, in contrast
to 2004, the US offered less support to civil society and the media and its role in
regime change is less prominent than expected and claimed by Russia.
Nevertheless, Western support for Ukraine’s media and civil society remained
important because, with a few exceptions, there is no local funding for these actors.
Independent media, especially new media, which played a crucial role on the
Maidan, is a sector where donor support was perceived as most valuable.26
Overall, both in Georgia and Ukraine, the EaP marked the EU’s prioritization
of good governance and institution-building, in contrast to the US, which pursued a
more traditional approach to democracy promotion, though less focussed on non-
state actors. Despite considerable efforts and resources still committed to democ-
racy promotion in the post-Soviet countries, since 2008 the US has been much less
inﬂuential under Obama’s administration due to broader changes in its foreign
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policy, interpreted in Georgia and Ukraine as a withdrawal from the post-Soviet
space.27
Democratization in Georgia and Ukraine: limited impact of democracy
promotion
Democracy promotion is only effective when there is a receptive domestic consti-
tuency. In this respect, Georgia and Ukraine demonstrate “the ability of external
actors to deal with changing local context”,28 and adjust to speciﬁc domestic con-
ditions in each country. Despite shared Soviet-era legacies and the experience of
“electoral revolutions”, Georgia and Ukraine have differed in terms of democrati-
zation agendas and actors, including veto players. Yet, both the US and EU have
been relatively inattentive to the domestic dynamics, reacting hesitantly and belat-
edly to events, despite their proclaimed aims in the region.
In Georgia, both the EU and the US have (at least initially) assumed that the
Rose Revolution would be an irreversible shift toward democratization. Yet, as
captured in the literature,29 while improving in terms of governance, the country
failed to build representative institutions and to ensure the participation of civil
society in the policy dialogue. The wide-ranging reform process which developed
after the Rose Revolution actually concentrated power in the president’s hands.
External democracy promoters continued to support those individuals and organ-
izations they had supported before 2004, thus failing to fully take domestic devel-
opments into account.30 Under Saakashvili, the EU was more outspoken on
democratic setbacks and placed a greater emphasis on the need for checks and bal-
ances than the US.31 Despite shortcomings in the democratization process, the US
has unconditionally supported the Georgian president for geopolitical purposes.32
The bulk of US assistance to Georgia was focussed on economic and military
support rather than democracy promotion.33 However, even if belatedly, the
current USAID country strategy for Georgia acknowledges both the shortcomings
in the democratization process under Saakashvili and the politicized use of US
assistance in Georgia.34
More recent domestic developments in Georgia highlight persisting dilemmas
for external democracy promoters. In the October 2012 parliamentary elections,
President Saakashvili’s United National Movement lost to the Georgian Dream
of Bidzina Ivanishvili. This was welcomed by both the EU and the US as the
ﬁrst democratic transfer of power in Georgia in free and fair elections. Both Brus-
sels and Washington exerted strong pressure on the president and the new prime
minister to ensure a smooth transition. However, the growing polarization of pol-
itical life again exacerbated tensions in the run-up to the 2013 presidential elec-
tions. In addition, the imprisonment of key political ﬁgures of the Saakashvili
period (including former Prime Minister Merabishvili), the arrest of the former
mayor of Tbilisi Gigi Ugulava, and the ﬁling of criminal charges against the
former president raised Western actors’ concerns about the use of the judiciary
as a political tool. On several occasions, EU leaders warned Georgia against
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selective justice. However, the EU was mainly driven by the desire to turn the EaP
into a success story prior to the Vilnius Summit in November 2013. Georgia is one
of the three countries which signed the Association Agreement/DCFTA and,
despite concerns over the political use of the judiciary, the new authorities have
been performing quite well in terms of regulatory alignment with EU acquis.
While they signiﬁcantly built upon the progress made under Saakashvili, they
have also moved away from the previous authorities’ liberal agenda for deregula-
tion, something that underpinned resistance to some EU regulations.35 Hence, EU
leaders (with the exception of members of the European Parliament and some EU
member states) have refrained from overly criticizing domestic developments in
Georgia.
In marked contrast, in Ukraine, the deteriorating political context under Presi-
dent Yanukovych (2010–2014) forced the EU, even if hesitantly, to resort to demo-
cratic conditionality in the process of concluding a new legal framework for
relations. In late 2011, the EU adopted a bolder position and postponed signing
the Association Agreement – the only tool at its disposal – to pressure the Ukrai-
nian authorities to address the deterioration of democratic standards. The signing of
the agreement was initially put on hold owing to political prosecutions of opposi-
tion ﬁgures, with the former prime minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, being the most
prominent. Moreover, the conduct of the 2012 parliamentary elections as well as
harassment of the political opposition and independent media during 2012–
2013 led to objections in the EU to signing the agreement. However, the EU over-
estimated its power of persuasion vis-a`-vis the non-democratic actors and misread
the domestic context in Ukraine. For example, the preoccupation with the
Tymoshenko case did not resonate widely with the Ukrainian public, since many
saw her as a highly populist, opportunistic ﬁgure ready to sacriﬁce democratization
in pursuit of political power.
The EU formulated a more comprehensive list of democratic conditions in
December 2012, including adoption of anti-corruption measures and reforms of
the electoral code and the judicial system, for signing the Association Agreement.
Symptomatically, this list failed to galvanize the ruling elites, that is, President
Yanukovych and the Party of Regions, into action. Making economic integration
contingent on upholding democratic standards entailed signiﬁcant political costs
for the Ukrainian authorities. This is because meeting EU conditions affected the
prospects of remaining in power for the ruling elites, which sought to consolidate
their power by rendering ineffective any domestic challenge to their rule. There-
fore, with explicit political conditionality, the pursuit of association with the EU
carried direct political risks for President Yanukovych and the ruling Party of
Regions in the context of preparations for the 2015 presidential elections. This
was recognized with the EU and democratic conditions were made more ﬂexible
in the run up to the Vilnius Summit, as the EU became concerned over “losing”
Ukraine and a “Vilnius failure”.36
Overall, at the political level, there was a palpable sense of disillusionment and
fatigue in the EU and the US with Ukraine already prior to and, especially, under
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President Yanukovych. The initial (and perhaps naı¨ve) hope was that Yanukovych
would actually bring stability and improvement to the chaotic “orange” regime.37
Both the US and the EU were fatigued by Ukraine.38 Yet while the EU’s highly
technocratic approach with its focus on rule-based functional cooperation helped
it retain credibility as a partner, it simultaneously created a distinct perception of
the EU as a disinterested and detached democracy promoter. The US had a second-
ary role during Yanukovych’s rule with little, if any, leverage over domestic
developments.
Therefore, both external actors were hardly prepared to respond to the political
crisis in Ukraine when it erupted in November 2013 as a result of Yanukovych’s
refusal to sign the Association Agreement. There is no evidence that the EU or
the US were involved in any way in instigating the mass protests or providing
any material or organizational support. During the protests, the EU limited itself
to welcoming the expression of support for Ukraine’s European orientation and
calling for a peaceful resolution to the crisis, punctuated by periodic visits by ofﬁ-
cials from EU institutions and member states. While during the protests on the
Maidan the EU appeared passive, the US was stronger on rhetoric (and outraged
with EU passivity).
Overall, in Ukraine neither the US nor the EU played a strong role, whether
during the 2013–2014 protests or prior to them. In Georgia, while the EU has
been more vocal on the setbacks of the democratization process (whether under
Saakashvili or after), neither the EU nor the US have used political conditionality
to effectively pressure the incumbent authorities. This is not unusual, especially
considering the Western responses to the Arab Spring. However, the EU’s initial
passivity and lack of strategy vis-a`-vis the protests in Ukraine have weakened its
standing as a committed democracy promoter. As such, the Ukrainian protesters
expressed strong support for European values – democracy, human rights, and
the rule of law – rather than the policies of the EU. The annexation of Crimea
by Russia in March 2014 also elicited strong condemnation but tepid and much-
delayed sanctions from the EU and US.39 In Georgia, however, it was the credi-
bility of the US which was most weakened in the wake of its passivity during
the 2008 conﬂict with Russia.
Therefore, our overall contention is that neither the US nor the EU has pursued
democracy promotion vigorously in Ukraine and Georgia. Democratization – even
if patchy and reversible – can be attributed to domestic factors, especially societal
mobilization against authoritarian leaders. However, its corollary has been a pro-
Western orientation of the countries, something which in turn triggered a powerful
backlash from Russia.
Russia’s counteracting strategies in Georgia and Ukraine
For sustained democratization, there should be no major power in the region oppos-
ing democracy, as argued byWhitehead.40 Russia is a vivid example of such a coun-
teracting power in the post-Soviet space, hostile to democracy promotion byWestern
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actors in the region. We argue that the key factor triggering Russia’s reaction to
Western policies is its perception of partner countries’ degree of integration with
Western organizations such as the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), that is, the institutionalization of the pro-Western orientation.
The introduction to this special issue highlights two conditions under which illib-
eral powers are likely to react toWestern democracy promotion policies: the percep-
tion of a threat to their own regime survival and to their geostrategic interests. In the
case of Russia, these two conditions are intertwined as, in historical terms, Russia is a
successor state to empires (both the Tsarist empire and the USSR) in which the pol-
itical regime and geopolitical expansion were closely linked. The literature has ident-
iﬁed the fear of democratic contagion as instrumental in Russia’s opposition to
democratization in neighbouring countries.41 Indeed, after each of three revolutions
in Georgia and Ukraine, out of fear of contagion, Russian authorities strengthened
their control over elections, limited the freedom of expression and assembly, and cir-
cumscribed the role of foreign countries in supporting civil society.
However, while the mechanisms and effects of Russia’s actions have been
extensively studied, less attention has been paid to the drivers behind them. We
hypothesize that Russia is driven not so much by a sense of feeling threatened
by democratization taking place in neighbouring countries per se, but rather the
Western inﬂuence which it believes underlies it (and leading to a decrease in
Russia’s inﬂuence). This is despite the fact that, as argued above, democratization
primarily occurred as a result of domestic factors rather than as a consequence of
external democracy promotion. The elites who gained power in the wake of mass
protests have also been strongly pro-Western. Therefore, besides being a threat to
Russia’s own regime stability, democratization in Ukraine and Georgia has been
deemed to undermine Russia’s hegemonic position in the post-Soviet space.
In essence, for Russia democracy-promotion policies are a smokescreen for
expanding the Western sphere of inﬂuence in the post-Soviet space. Democracy
promotion in the post-Soviet space is therefore seen by Russia as a geopolitical
tool used by the West in contestation with Russia. Relations of neighbouring
states with NATO have long been viewed with suspicion in Russia and so has
increasingly the EU’s EaP, much to the EU’s surprise. This is because the Associ-
ation Agreements run counter to Russia’s plans for close economic reintegration of
the post-Soviet countries though the Eurasian Economic Union, one of the key
instruments for Russia’s assertion of regional hegemony.42
Therefore, we hypothesize that the major driver behind Russia’s responses is its
objection to fostering closer ties between the post-Soviet states and the West. A
corollary of this is that the more advanced, wide-ranging, and tangible integration
is in institutional terms, the more threatening it will be perceived as by Russia,
leading to stronger countervailing responses. The Russian government can more
easily and rapidly utilize a broader array of instruments (economic, political, or
military) than the West,43 and demonstrated its readiness to do so, that is, to
resort to hard power and coercion to achieve its aim of containing the Western
inﬂuence.
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In Georgia, relations with Russia signiﬁcantly worsened immediately after the
Rose Revolution. Russia actually viewed the political changes that led to the
ousting of President Shevardnadze as a coup d’e´tat. The pro-Western orientation
of President Saakashvili only exacerbated Russia’s irritation, triggering increasingly
harsher reactions as Georgia got closer to NATO. Between 2004 and 2008 Russia
scaled up pressure on Georgian authorities to hinder integration with Western struc-
tures. For example, to undermine Georgia’s territorial integrity, Russian passports
were offered (pasportizatsiya) to citizens of the two breakaway regions: Abkhazia
and South Ossetia. In 2006, when relations between Georgia and Russia abruptly
deteriorated, trade and migration ﬂows were disrupted. Georgia was also subjected
toRussian trade embargos, withGeorgianwines, water, and vegetables being banned
and transport connections between Moscow and Tbilisi being suspended. Following
the autumn 2006 espionage controversy, Russian authorities strengthened adminis-
trative controls over Georgian migrants living in Russia and deported a signiﬁcant
number of Georgians. Ultimately, Russia intervened militarily a few months after
the NATO Bucharest Summit agreed that Georgia would become a NATO
member (even though no actual mechanism for realizing this prospect was outlined).
While Russia initially claimed it was using its prerogatives as a peacekeeper
under the Dagomys agreement to intervene in South Ossetia, the fact that the
Russian army went signiﬁcantly beyond the breakaway regions and into Georgian
territory indicated its stance on the prospect of NATO’s accession.44 The recog-
nition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s independence in August 2008 created a
“point of no return” in Georgian-Russian relations. While trade ﬂows and transport
connections had already stopped since 2006, Russia’s move put an end to the dip-
lomatic relations between the two countries – while also triggering a break in
Georgia’s rapprochement with NATO. Therefore, since 2008 Russia has primarily
tried to inﬂuence Georgia indirectly, for example, through supporting, including
militarily, the breakaway regions.
Like in Georgia, Russia’s role in Ukraine has been multi-faceted and highly
adaptive to a rapidly changing context. First, the strategy centred on short-term
cross-conditionality to undermine the attractiveness of the EU and responsiveness
to EU’s democratic conditionality. In doing so, Russia exploited the weaknesses of
the EU strategy in the context of growing authoritarian tendencies and the resulting
isolation of the Ukrainian authorities during Yanukovych’s presidency. The EU’s
approach has been premised mostly on the long-term beneﬁts of functional inte-
gration into the single market. However, this emphasis on long-term beneﬁts
required lengthening time horizons of the political class in the neighbouring
countries. Enlargement created a favourable framework for lengthening time hor-
izons of the political elites in the accession countries: the prospect of EU member-
ship stretched the time framework for decision-making on ambitious,
comprehensive, and costly reforms in East-Central Europe.45 But the EU lacks
similar leverage under the neighbourhood policy.
This dearth becomes especially signiﬁcant in the context of Russia’s role in the
region: In late 2013, the economic crisis and high energy prices proved highly
468 L. Delcour and K. Wolczuk
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 B
irm
ing
ha
m]
 at
 09
:12
 15
 Ja
nu
ary
 20
16
 
conducive to a shortening of time horizons for the Ukrainian ruling elites under
Yanukovych. Faced with Russia’s economic and political pressure combined
with signiﬁcant incentives, Yanukovych did not sign the Association Agreement
during the Vilnius Summit in November 2013.46 Shortly after, he accepted the
Russian offer of a ﬁnancial bailout of 15 billion dollars, in the context of a
growing ﬁscal crisis in Ukraine and the forthcoming presidential elections of
2015. Providing economic support to authoritarian leaders who become increas-
ingly isolated from theWest is a noted Russian strategy.47 By providing immediate,
large-scale economic support to Yanukovych, vastly exceeding anything the
Western institutions were willing to offer, Russia offered a lifeline to his increas-
ingly authoritarian regime.
Following the regime change (as a result of violent clashes and Yanukovych’s
escape), Russia responded to the coming to power of pro-Western leaders in
Ukraine with a punitive, hard-power reaction. In addition to economic and
energy-related pressure, Russia has sought to undermine Ukrainian statehood.
This was most dramatically evidenced in the annexation of Crimea in March
2014. Then, in the second phase, Russia’s strategy centred on repeating a similar
scenario in south-eastern Ukraine, a region with historical links to Russia (labelled
“Novorossiya” even though the name has little resonance and hence low mobilizing
potential in Ukraine itself).48 But it only succeeded in Donbass, where Russia sup-
ported separatist forces, depicting them as part of a bottom-up local rebellion,
denying any involvement. This “hybrid warfare” deliberately blurs the boundaries
between state-controlled regular armed forces and the rogue local and mercenary
forces. It is effective owing to the porous border between the Donbass region and
Russia (the demarcation of the Ukrainian-Russian border has long been opposed
by Russia), easy transportation routes, and ready volunteers within and from
beyondUkraine. This subterfuge has failed and the conﬂict transformed into a Ukrai-
nian-Russian war.49 This is because with a new impetus provided by the election of
President Poroshenko in May 2014, the growing success of the Ukrainian armed
forces against the separatists during the summer prompted Russia to provide more
explicit support to the separatists, including weaponry and personnel.50 At the
same time, Russia’s policy vis-a`-vis Ukraine has been wrapped up in a historical nar-
rative whereby Ukraine has been re-conceptualized as forming an “integral” part of
Russia owing to linguistic, historical, cultural, and religious ties, thereby justifying
Russia’s aggressive actions against Ukraine’s sovereignty.51
Our analysis indicates that the greater the perception of threat by Russia, the
harsher its response has been. Russia tends not to explicitly counteract Western
efforts at democracy promotion per se but, rather, at ﬁrst, promotes and supports
pro-Russian actors whenever possible inside the countries, and, failing that,
moves to undermine the capacity of the “target countries” to pursue integration
with the West. However, in Georgia and Ukraine, Russia’s role as a spoiler
comes at different times in terms of both domestic political changes and the inte-
gration with Western structures. The differences in timing result in diverse conse-
quences for democratization and also trigger diverse reactions from the West.
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The effects of Russia’s response: spoiling or unintentionally favouring
democratization?
In this section we examine the outcomes of Russia’s counteracting policies and
specify the conditions under which they inﬂuence democratization processes in
Georgia and Ukraine. In doing so we conﬁrm the assumptions presented in the
introduction to this special issue, yet also bring important nuances. The introduc-
tion posits that the outcome of external actors’ policies depends upon their inﬂu-
ence on the domestic balance of power between liberal and illiberal elites and
citizens, which is in turn conditioned by economic and security linkages and by
the leverage which the external actors have over domestic forces.
In both countries, by posing a major security threat and promoting challenges
to territorial integrity, Russia could be seen as just taking attention away from dom-
estic reforms, including democratization. Yet, having failed to sway the countries
by peaceful means, Russia has challenged their statehood in order to jeopardize the
linked processes of democratization and integration with the Western organiz-
ations. This is because the territorial integrity of the state, control over means of
coercion, and secure/stable borders are essential prerequisites to democratization.
Tolstrup has shown how Russia is able to affect the neighbouring countries’ “effec-
tive power to rule”, by using economic leverages or supporting secessionist enti-
ties.52 Yet, by showing how Russian attempts at destabilizing partner countries
subvert their democratization, the literature focuses exclusively on Russia’s role
as a negative (and effective) actor. By emphasizing the spoiling effects, the litera-
ture omits the positive (though unintended) effect of Russia’s actions on strength-
ening democracy in the “contested neighbourhood”.
We argue that such effects occur because Russia’s initiatives to undermine both
countries’ statehood actually weaken linkages and reduce the regional power’s
leverage over domestic elites and societies.53 In fact, Russia’s actions have
united the national elites and population (outside the “breakaway” regions)
around sovereignty, democracy, and integration with the West.
In the case of Georgia, for example, there was little Russia could do in 2009–
2012 to hinder Georgia’s progress toward EU integration, since breakaway regions
were de facto occupied and Georgia had diversiﬁed its trade ﬂows as a result of the
Russian 2006 embargo. Following the 2012 elections in Georgia, the new auth-
orities have sought to normalize ties between the two countries and have
adopted a less confrontational stance vis-a`-vis Moscow.54 This new approach pro-
vided Russia with renewed leverage over the country.
On the one hand, Russia has continued to exploit breakaway regions as its
main instrument of pressure, for example, through promoting “borderization”
(that is, the construction of barricades along the administrative borderline of
South Ossetia and actually expanding the territory of the breakaway region)
and strongly inﬂuencing the selection of leaders there (for example, the
ousting of the Abkhaz de facto President Aleksandr Ankvab, who resisted
Russian pressure on several occasions and adopted a softer stance vis-a`-vis the
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Georgian population in Abkhazia).55 Russia’s proposed “alliance and inte-
gration” treaty to Abkhazia, however, goes beyond the destabilization tactics
which had been used since 2008 and envisages a merger of military forces,
coordination of police, and an alignment with the Russia-led Eurasian Economic
Union.56 It is perhaps unsurprising that the proposal was tabled in a context of
enhanced contacts between Georgia and NATO.
On the other hand, the re-opening of trade ﬂows, in particular, has triggered
new expectations in Georgia vis-a`-vis the Russian market. While this has resulted
in increased trade ﬂows between the two, this increases the number of trade instru-
ments, including embargos that Russia can utilize. It is perhaps unsurprising that
the trade leverage was soon used again after the EU-Georgia Association Agree-
ment was signed, when Russia drafted a decree suspending the Russian-Georgian
Free Trade Agreement signed in February 1994.57
Yet, Russia’s behaviour has so far yielded opposite effects from those intended
in both cases. By threatening the sovereignty and existence of Georgia and
Ukraine, Russia’s policies induced both countries to make substantial efforts in
terms of democratization, in compliance with US and especially EU recommen-
dations and requirements.
Despite polarization in Georgian domestic politics, a broad consensus on inte-
gration with Western structures has so far persisted. There are very few actors that
Russia can mobilize to divert the country’s geopolitical orientation away from the
EU andNATO. For instance, only two small political parties oppose EU integration
while advocating closer links with Russia.58 True, the Georgian Orthodox Church
strongly opposes some of the measures (for example, anti-discrimination legis-
lation) demanded by the EU as part of the visa liberalization process – it is not
however challenging integration. However, even if prompted by the sharply dete-
riorating political climate inside the ruling coalition rather than inspired by Russia,
the dismissal and resignation of key ministers in charge of defence, foreign affairs,
and Euro-Atlantic integration in November 2014 may affect the country’s actual
integration with both the EU and NATO.
In Ukraine, Russia succeeded in exerting pressure on illiberal elites by dissuad-
ing President Yanukovych from signing the Association Agreement. Yet mass pro-
tests ensued. Even though very few protestors were actually familiar with the
content of the Association Agreement, for them Europe symbolized democracy,
human rights, and the rule of law – precisely the principles sorely lacking in
Ukraine under Yanukovych.59 For the protesters, moving closer to Russia
offered more of the same: deteriorating democratic standards and governance, sup-
pression of the opposition, media, civil society, and corruption. While Russia
would work effectively with the “pliant”, self-interested, and short-thinking
elites, it had no similar purchase over the public, as indicated by a Maidan
slogan “we won’t sell our freedom for gas”.
Inadvertently, Russia’s policies have actually facilitated compliance with EU
demands. By propping up authoritarian leaders in Ukraine and then engaging in
a military conﬂict in Ukraine and Georgia, Russia has given a powerful push to
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the pro-Western orientation not only at the elite but also societal levels. As former
president of Poland, Aleksander Kwasniewski, who acted as an emissary of the
European Parliament to Ukraine during 2012–2013, put it in July 2014:
[Putin] can fail because of societal attitudes. There never has been such a high level of
anti-Russian feelings in Ukraine. It could turn out that even when faced with an econ-
omic catastrophy, the Ukrainian people will proclaim that our dignity and soveregnty
are more important than pacts with Putin. Russia still believes that destabilisation,
pressure, propaganda and money will turn Ukraine back to Moscow.60
Nevertheless, it can also be hypothesized that by undermining both countries’ state-
hood and territorial integrity, Russia has also made democratization more difﬁcult.
Since the shift of power at the end of 2012, Russia has indirectly fuelled the
growing polarization of political life in Georgia.61 Despite a broad consensus on
the prioritization of Euro-Atlantic integration, Russia has emerged as a divisive
issue in the domestic political debate. The then PrimeMinister Ivanishvili has repeat-
edly criticized the former authorities on their strategy vis-a`-vis Russia and, conver-
sely, the normalization sought withMoscow has been ﬁercely opposed by the former
president’s allies. Since 2012, the policy shift toward Russia has remained rhetorical
rather than substantive, yet Russia’s growing presence in the political discourse has
contributed to increasing tensions between the authorities and the opposition (as
shown, for instance, by the reactions to Ivanishvili’s statement on the need for
Georgia to consider the Eurasian option).62 The break-up of the Georgian Dream
coalition in November 2014 does not only add political instability to the sharply
polarized political climate. It also makes Euro-Atlantic integration more complex
(especially the implementation of the Association Agreement and DCFTA) and
offers new opportunities for Russia to manipulate domestic politics.
The emergence of Russia as a direct security threat to Ukraine since 2014 has
served to consolidate Ukraine’s pro-Western orientation, underpinned by a strong
commitment to democracy amongst civil society and the political elites that came
to power in 2014. Russia’s undeclared war against Ukraine diminished the inﬂuence
it was able to exert through language, culture, and religion, even in Russian-speaking
south-eastern Ukraine. However, Ukraine’s ability to pursue wide-ranging democra-
tization, including institution-building, has so far been severely circumscribed by the
crippling conﬂict in eastern Ukraine and a prioritization of security issues amidst a
deep economic crisis. Contrary to Russia’s discourse, the country is not a “failed
state”: if anything, the conﬂict in Donbass has galvanized society and state structures
(which became notoriously weak) in the face of unprecedented external threats pro-
viding the push for reforms. However, a sense of insecurity and vulnerability also
fuels frustration and impatience with formal political processes and carries the risk
of growing populism and radicalization.
In sum, Russia has endeavoured to destabilize Ukraine and Georgia by jeopar-
dizing their territorial integrity. Yet, by undermining their statehood, Russian
actions has consolidated the political and foreign policy courses in both countries.
472 L. Delcour and K. Wolczuk
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 B
irm
ing
ha
m]
 at
 09
:12
 15
 Ja
nu
ary
 20
16
 
So far this is clearly the most direct and unintended effect of Russia’s policies. At
the same time, by supporting breakaway regions, Russia has also undermined
Ukraine’s and Georgia’s “effective power to rule”,63 thereby indirectly affecting
their capacity to conduct reforms, including democratization.
Conclusions
In both Georgia and Ukraine political developments have been far from linear,
illustrating the complex political trajectories of even the most pro-Western
countries in the post-Soviet space. The push for democracy came from domestic
actors: the Rose Revolution, the Orange Revolution, and the Maidan were not
so much the result of the efforts of the EU and US, but rather combined bottom-
up and intra-elites’ pressures to oust the incumbent regimes. Yet, oblivious to dom-
estic demands for democracy, Russia regards these domestic changes as resulting
from “Western interventions” which aimed to promote pro-Western geopolitical
realignment in the post-Soviet space. In response to such a perceived Western
“plot”, Russia felt compelled to simultaneously “punish” the countries and
prevent their integration with the West.
For the West, almost six years after the conﬂict in Georgia, the annexation of
Crimea and the hybrid war in eastern Ukraine turned out to be a rude awakening
regarding Russia’s ends and means. The EU and the US neglected Russian sensi-
tivities and interpretations of their motives and actions, let alone the multiple
dependencies that Russia could exploit vis-a`-vis the target countries. Thus, the
EU and US failed to grasp Russia’s sheer determination to prevent a pro-
Western orientation of the neighbouring countries and they have not been able
(and willing) to promptly respond with adequate countermeasures to shore up
democracy and sovereignty of those countries.
However, (so far) Russia has not prevailed: the inﬂuence of the EU and US has
arguably increased as a result of Russia’s actions. Russia’s biggest strengths –
economic pressure and military might – have been utilized in a way counterpro-
ductive to Russia’s proclaimed interests. Instead of bringing Ukraine and
Georgia back in to the fold, the use of force made them ever more mindful of
the threat presented by Russia and, as a result, ever more determined to integrate
with Western structures. Thus, the biggest paradox from the Russian perspective
is that its policies have inadvertently imbued the EU and the US with dispropor-
tionate levels of inﬂuence.
Four broader conclusions can be drawn.
The ﬁrst one relates to the drivers behind illiberal powers’ actions and conﬁrms
one of the assumptions presented in the introduction to this special issue: geopoli-
tical interests (rather than fear of democratic contagion) drive illiberal power’s
objections to any developments that are perceived as weakening its leverage
over the “target countries”. Our article points to the correlation between, on the
one hand, Georgia and Ukraine’s increased linkages and integration with
Western structures, and, on the other hand, Russia’s countervailing responses.
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Second, as noted in the introduction, the West’s agenda of democracy pro-
motion does not correspond to actual policies toward individual countries. Never-
theless, even when democracy promotion is weak and/or ineffective, illiberal
powers can blame Western democracy promotion for democratic changes in
target countries. This means that democratic breakthroughs that occur in countries
targeted by democracy promotion (even when they do not necessarily result from
democracy promotion as such) can be interpreted by illiberal powers as “med-
dling” and “intervention” and trigger reaction from illiberal powers to counteract
geopolitical implications of such “interventions”.
The third conclusion focuses on the mechanisms used by illiberal powers to
counter democracy promotion. As suggested in the introduction to this special
issue, illiberal powers countervail democracy promotion through empowering
illiberal groups in neighbouring countries. Supporting authoritarian incumbent
elites through political, economic, and security means is indeed the simplest and
most effective way to secure loyalty. However, when the authoritarian elites are
replaced by pro-Western leaders, as has been the case in Georgia and Ukraine, illib-
eral powers can no longer rely upon non-democratic domestic players inside the
countries. Yet, with few domestic constraints, illiberal powers are free to activate
a broad array of tools, ranging from political and economic ones to coercion and
force, and are able to deploy them at will. This readiness has been an unwelcome
surprise for democracy promoters.
Finally, the effects of the actions by illiberal powers on domestic democrati-
zation deserve closer scrutiny. By undermining their statehood and violating their
territorial integrity, illiberal powers inadvertently push the target countries
toward the West, increasing the inﬂuence of democracy promoters and thereby
strengthening the prospects for democratization. However, at the time of
writing, this democratization outcome is not certain, especially with regard to
Ukraine. Russia’s actions are likely to provide further evidence not only on the
extent to which illiberal powers can affect the capacity to conduct reforms,
including democratization in the target countries, but also how far democracy
promoters are willing to shore up democratization when faced with a belligerent
illiberal power.
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